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ABSTRACT 
 
 The comfortable thought is over in our psychical relation to Percy Shelley and 
Sigmund Freud because the line of reasoning it invokes is chaotic, if only because trying 
to define psyche and history leads to chaotic conclusions, especially at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century. Shelley and Freud recognized this and were able to channel it 
into their art, myth, fable, allegory. The events of their lives, their History, produces itself 
from chaos (Freud writes across two World Wars, Shelley under the shadow of the 
French Revolution, Jacobin massacres and Napoleonic wars), which means its producer 
is chaotic, Divine Chaos, Miltonic Chaos, but chaos it still remains. There is no 
systematic order to their thought except that systematic order escapes all Thought, true 
thought, at least. Please bear this in mind when you read the confused pages that follow, 
which seek to tether chaos to coherence. Above all, this is an attempt to separate the 
wheat from chaff in Shelley and in Freud.  
 Percy Shelley’s psychological poetry speaks a language less heard than read; the opposite 
holds true for Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. I argue that in order to hear Shelley and 
read Freud, it is necessary to first discover and then impose a grammatical architecture already 
present in their writings. Such mental scaffoldings occupy what Shelley calls Love, Freud, Eros. 
Each conceptual term demonstrates within and without its boundaries the same radical rebellion 
of thought: the sum of duty enjoined and buttressed by the artist’s mind must always ruin the 
imaginary landscape, across and from which the mind imagines. 
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Introduction 
 
Go your way; behold, I send you out lambs among wolves. 
 —Luke 10:3 
 
 Our comfortable thought about Psyche and History is over. Our rested and 
repeated notions of Percy Shelley, over. We no longer think of Shelley as Sun-Treader, 
which Robert Browning called him. As regards Freud, the story is somewhat different in 
that we have yet to find any comfort in his thought. 
 Percy Shelley and Sigmund Freud deserve and merit our ears and eyes; their 
thought still speaks to us, and I understand why some could call them prophets; yet their 
writings deserve much more than we are able to read right now. The title seer, maker or 
vates is for the majority of people who hear it said absurd, ridiculous and puerile. So 
when I use the word prophet, I mean the OED’s definition of it, a “Divinely inspired 
person, and related senses” (emphasis mine). Most critics, literary, historical, 
philosophical, psychological, scientific take what I have emphasized in the OED’s 
definition of “prophet” and construe around it an argument or defense of the word, as if 
we can no longer call poet’s prophets, prophets poets because we are beyond such cant. 
However, I choose to let “Divinely Inspired Person” stand alone without any qualifiers or 
semantic or semiotic challenges. I do this for two reasons: first, brevity; second, I once 
read a major twentieth century author1 define it in a curious way. He reminds us that we 
are only vertebrae, nothing more. But he qualified that statement with this: we are 
vertebrae tipped with a divine spark. 
                                                
1 Nabokov, Vladimir. Lectures on Literature, 6. 
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 The comfortable thought is over in our psychical relation to Percy Shelley and 
Sigmund Freud because the line of reasoning it invokes is chaotic, if only because trying 
to define psyche and history leads to chaotic conclusions, especially at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century. Shelley and Freud recognized this and were able to channel it 
into their art, myth, fable, allegory. The events of their lives, their History, produces itself 
from chaos (Freud writes across two World Wars, Shelley under the shadow the French 
Revolution, Jacobin massacres and Napoleonic wars), which means its producer is 
chaotic, Divine Chaos, Miltonic Chaos, but chaos it still remains. There is no systematic 
order to their thought except that systematic order escapes all Thought, true thought, at 
least. Please bear this in mind when you read the confused pages that follow, which seek 
to tether chaos to coherence. Above all, this is an attempt to separate the wheat from 
chaff in Shelley and in Freud.  
 Percy Shelley’s psychological poetry speaks a language less heard than read; the opposite 
holds true for Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. I argue that in order to hear Shelley and 
read Freud, it is necessary to first discover and then impose a grammatical architecture already 
present in their writings. Such mental scaffoldings occupy what Shelley calls Love, Freud, Eros. 
Each conceptual term demonstrates within and without its boundaries the same radical rebellion 
of thought: the sum of duty enjoined and buttressed by the artist’s mind must always ruin the 
imaginary landscape, across and from which the mind imagines. 
 Shelley interprets “Love” as he does poetry and Poet: a psychical condition out of which 
blooms—simultaneously—creation and destruction. Normally, an attempt is made to scavenge 
Shelley’s truest construal of poetic aesthetics from the Defense of Poetry, something like poets 
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are the unacknowledged legislators of the world; but a more potent and revealing glimpse into 
Shelley’s poetic project shows up in the preface to Prometheus Unbound: “Poets, not otherwise 
than philosophers, painters, sculptors and musicians, are in one sense the creators and in another 
the creations of their age. From this subjection the loftiest do not escape” (208; emphasis mine). 
Shelley implicitly suggests he is a member of the “loftiest,” yet remembers to temper such elitism 
with figural absolutism, subjection and slavery (mental and material), and also a psychological 
declaration of subjection. Both paradigms would seem abhorrent to Shelley, yet Shelley 
possesses the mental agility to not only hold them but also versify them at once. Furthermore, 
Shelley’s desire to escape becoming a creation of his age might not be as energetic as the preface 
leads us to believe. Actually, Prometheus Unbound can be read solely as a product of Shelley’s 
contemporaneity, the historical and literary moment in which Shelley composed it. Reading the 
poem this way, however, is reductive and misses the mark of Shelley’s aim, which is history and 
psyche as both interdependent and separate, the former text and latter reader of text. In making 
the distinction between creator and creation in the preface, Shelley acts the Platonic dualist, but 
he is at once also echoing Aristotle through the idea that what we cannot escape is our desire to 
subject order to stratification and materialism, groupings and quantifiers; in trying to make a slave 
out of order, we become order’s slave. We see this happening in the first act to Prometheus, who 
is unwilling to imagine, let alone declare another order to things. With this in mind, the preface to 
Prometheus tells us one of its principle themes: order is perspectival; when you look at the world 
differently and speak to it differently, the world will change in turn.   
 The poet, so Shelley would have us believe, is a slave to subject rather than object, a slave 
period, whose master we shall see is Chaos. More than most British Romantics, Shelley 
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incorporates an allusory dance across the Greeks, Romans and Germans, Dante and Rousseau. 
Like Coleridge, who borrows incessantly from a diverse array of source material, Shelley’s 
eclectic erudition is always working against the idea of the One Mind that he writes about in 
Defense of Poetry, against the Idealism to which critics often confine him. Yet what we could 
name Shelley’s monistic tendencies, the Idealistic half of the title Skeptical Idealist, would better 
serve Shelleyean scholarship if “manacled” substituted for “monistic.” Furthermore, that Shelley 
digests the tradition of the ancients (Defense of Poetry is an available example) simply 
demonstrates the impossibility of achieving such an ambitious goal as realizing in one poem or 
many the One Mind, One Poem. Shelley’s language is always elastic and adaptable, in both 
meaning and formal presentation, always in doubt about itself. As Marc Redfield tells us, this 
doubt occurs as critical misreading in Shelley’s The Mask of Anarchy, but I see his insights 
happening in Prometheus Unbound also:  
  The Mask is a dream that generates and destroys its dreamer both as a character  
  and as a source of authority; it collapses into the stutter of “these words”—these  
  words on the page that, as professional academics, we read again, again, again.2  
  (159) 
Prometheus Unbound holds no claim to material reality, so calling it a dream is accurate, and it 
will collapse if what we, as professional academics, persist in doing wrongly, which is reading it 
wrongly. In the first act, Prometheus stutters again and again trying to recall “these words,” and 
in the fourth, we as readers, stutter to recall the words of acts one, two and three. Redfield using 
the word dream because dreams are always already in doubt because we can never remember 
                                                
2 Redfield, Marc. The Politics of Aesthetics.  
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them wholly; they are partial inscriptions on the psyche.   
 A similar skepticism pervades Freud’s writing, and rather than anticipating Freud’s 
definition of Eros, which I contend is the brilliant casting of the mind’s multi-colored shadow in 
struggle with itself against conscience and society, Shelley demonstrates it poetically in 
Prometheus Unbound. In Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents, in which “Eros” grapples with 
“Ananke” (Necessity) and “Thanatos” (Death drive) for control of self-control, Freud goes so far 
as to exalt Love above all other attribute of the mind’s psychology, just as Shelley does. He says, 
“[a]t the height of being in Love, the boundary between ego and object threatens to melt away,” 
and he also contends that although Love is a normal mental entity, most pathological processes 
rely on a false reading of the demarcation between self and society (13).  
 Freud’s seminal work on man in society tells the story of what happens when we try to 
live independent of Fate, Chance and Destiny, when the wellspring of all happiness draws from 
the ego-subject; in other words, he writes against Idealism. Largely a treatise on doctrinal 
Religion, Civilization and its Discontents puts into play a disturbing notion: Civilization 
possesses a single pathology—itself—which, of course, can also cure itself. Freud says that 
happiness must always be an episodic phenomenon because the human species can only 
experience pleasure and pain through contraries: “We are so made that we can derive intense 
enjoyment only from a contrast and very little from a state of things” (25-6). And like Shelley, 
Freud understands the evolutionary progress of these civil contrasts (and contracts) carried 
forward within the psychical and individual development of the individual mind, which always 
posits, and only sometimes chooses to recall through memory the attributes of natural and 
civilized man, as History. I will show how Prometheus Unbound proleptically performs Freud’s 
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interpretation of Self (ego, id, super-ego) up until its last line, “This is alone Life, Joy, Empire 
and Victory,” where it collapses in one final rebellion of exile and ecstasy (IV.578).  
 I mentioned above that in order to hear Shelley and read Freud, we first must discover and 
then impose a grammatical architecture already present in their thought and words. What we 
discover is presence is already not a possible condition for the intellect as soon as we recognize 
its pastness. I will adopt Freud’s name for this psychical entity, Eternal City, which stands 
already complete in Prometheus Unbound; in fact, I make the claim that the Eternal Mind is what 
Prometheus establishes, itself as poem. Therefore, when reading Shelley, we lay among the ruins, 
and while listening to Freud, among future excavations; finally, however, the conditions which 
dissociate the two postures, violently consume each other; as readers of Shelley and Freud, we 
bear witness to this almost ineffable sublime force, swerve them into our own contemporary, and 
therefore superannuated moment.  
 In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud chooses ancient and modern Rome as his 
analogue to what he describes as “preservation in the sphere of the mind,” or how “memory-
traces” are drawn and annihilated in both individual and social realms (16). By this, he means 
simply that we do not understand how individuals make memories, sustain them or recall them 
intentionally or unintentionally. These psychological processes, in this instance, at least, herald 
an astonishing and self-replicating claim to the philosophy of History, one in which Shelley’s 
poetry sometimes transcends and is defeated. I examine this more closely in chapter two of this 
thesis, but for now it is important to know what Freud actually says: “If we want to represent 
historical sequence in spatial terms we can only do it by juxtaposition in space: the same space 
cannot have two different contents” (19). I quote Shelley to illustrate the versification of this 
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thought, and show how Freud is partly correct in saying we are far from “mastering the 
characteristics of mental life by representing them in pictorial terms” (19). The following lines are 
Shelley’s, and occur in the most desperate passage of Prometheus Unbound:  
                                                     Yet pause, and plunge 
  Into Eternity, where recorded time, 
  Even all that we imagine, age on age,  
  Seems but a point, and the reluctant mind 
  Flags wearily in its unending flight 
  Till it sink, dizzy, blind, lost, shelterless;  
  Perchance it has not numbered the slow years 
  Which thou [Prometheus] must spend in torture, unreprieved. (I.17-23) 
Mercury essentially explains to Prometheus in this passage why Freud contends we cannot color 
our vision long enough to see at once both the “scanty remains” of Republican Rome and the 
“great metropolis that has grown up in the last few centuries since the Renaissance” (19). Shelley 
recurs this idea, which center’s on a “point,” yet rather than realizing it, he submits to its 
dizzying power and blindness, which in the remainder of Prometheus Unbound is adapted 
towards pluralistic language and thought. As readers, the passage encourages us to follow its line 
of reasoning also and “pause” and “plunge” into each passage, suspend it and look at it from all 
available angles. The rewards for this kind of reading are great, and are paralleled in Prometheus’s 
recollection of his curse.   
 In the two chapters which follow, I argue that History, the story of our social progress 
and evolution as a social species, and history, the story of our individual psychological 
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development, our past, present and future are conditioned by the Psyche, by what we are not, 
and, paradoxically, what we once were and will become again. As regards the subject of this 
thesis, Shelley’s poetry and Freud’s prose, my methodology is tracing within Shelley the 
psychomachia, or struggle of the soul, that becomes so literal in Freud, and vise versa. Our past 
and future is always a struggle within the soul because we think we know where it abides, in the 
starry heavens above, and where it comes, from the moral duty within.3 Poetry and History are 
bondservants to the Psyche. The debt pays in full, more often than not.   
                                                
3 This is a rough borrowing of Kant’s epitaphal inscription on his tombstone. 
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Chapter One 
Alas! I wonder at, yet pity thee. 
—Mercury (PU I.428) 
  
 Prometheus Unbound enlists the linguistic and cultural inhibitions that authority imposes 
on and requires from the individual. My reading takes as its point of departure an analysis of the 
poem at its archetypal, psycho-cultural level, finding in Shelley’s poem through Freud an 
expression of the sustained anxiety “of the superior power of Fate” (20). Arriving at Shelley’s 
four-act lyrical drama by way of Freudian paradigms would seem arbitrary if this is all I wished 
to do; but I argue that in reading Freud we can hear Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound—Shelley 
becomes present in Freud’s theses. My goal from reading Shelley’s longest and most sustained 
composition, which is also his most complexly arranged, is double-minded: 1) to demystify the 
struggle staged in Prometheus of the individual and authoritative mind; and 2) to grasp the 
meaning, and the force and value drawn from this meaning, of Shelley’s decision to render 
Prometheus and Jupiter their imaginary poetic embodiments. My goal from reading Freud is 
similarly divided: 1) to demonstrate how Prometheus affects a sense of the uncanny through 
Shelleyean Love; and 2) to show the value of directing Shelley’s philosophical poetics toward 
Freud’s.4 What I see happening in the writings of Shelley and Freud is a willing admittance of the 
limitations of the brokering power of the Psyche, which is represented at its highest level in 
Shelley by Love and in Freud by Eros.  
                                                
4 Freud the modern Philosopher is to my understanding the mode of discourse that best 
delivers his theoretical project, and does not play into the double bind of proceeding from 
the proposition that Freud is the “Father of Psycho-analytic interpretation,” wherein we 
as readers become another iteration of infantile helplessness, and our turn back to Freud, 
a substitutive satisfaction of paternal protection. 
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 Each author exploits the limitations of the “affective nucleus” of their thought in order to 
yield a gain. If we are to believe Freud when he tells us that “we are so made that we can derive 
intense enjoyment only from a contrast and very little from a state of things,” then we are 
pressed to consider the knowledge of this contrast, its positive and negative side (25-6). Because 
in Prometheus Shelley tries to record the psychological revolutions of a model mind inhabiting a 
model civilized man, then the theories we attach to Freudian psychoanalysis offer the surest 
interruption to Shelley’s thought; Freud de-familiarizes Shelley, turns Prometheus Unbound into 
an uncanny poem. Similarly, the logical converse of “Freudianizing” Shelley admits a more poetic 
reading of Freud. Those moments while reading Freud in which disappear the psychoanalytic 
case histories of patients in pursuance of a greater story reproduce and revalue Freud as inheritor 
of a much more comprehensive record of philosophical inquiry than the once novel rubric, 
psychoanalytic interpretation. Shelley familiarizes Freud for us, turning our evolving notions of 
“literary history” and cultural criticism into a collective compulsion to repeat, and then refute or 
revalue, the meaning of Freud’s claims. In effect, the existence of Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound 
demonstrates Freud’s persistent unintentional return; and in its windows we can see ourselves as 
onlookers, inhibited by the domestic comfort of the familiar. The question admits its answer only 
in reading Shelley’s best poem, Prometheus Unbound.   
 Because the works of Sigmund Freud are canonized texts in a similar sense to Percy 
Shelley’s, for each press their influence beyond the discourse they occasion as Modern and 
Romantic, each author distributes his most important claims according to a central theme: 
Freudian Eros and Shelleyean Love. The centrality of these guiding principles tasks itself the aim 
of soliciting and subverting the height and reach of the existential and cultural symptoms that 
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have determined Western philosophy and poetics since at least the French Revolution. “Poets,” 
Shelley tells us in the preface to Prometheus Unbound in a passage I quoted above in the 
Introduction, “not otherwise than philosophers, painters, sculptors and musicians, are in one 
sense the creators and in another the creations of their age” (208). Shelley’s poem, which tells its 
story along lines similar to what Freud calls the exposure myth of Moses, rigorously interrogates 
the truth of this claim, and, finally, operates against it. Drawing out from the poem two 
antagonistic ideas, one begins to breathe its air (or heir, so to speak): the misted clarity of Love as 
precondition for Shelley’s cultural ideals and the bitterant knowledge that this Love recognizes 
and brings about. The point of intersection between them represents the principle of difference 
the poem aims at: a restructuring of history and psyche, a “victory” of love, obtained at the 
psychological and political level. Freud’s contribution to this belated victory through the 
economics of the libido5 fixes itself firmly to our notions of what is scientific and philosophical 
inquiry, questioning the methodologies that produce the possibility for such. We can draw from 
this impact, which is the impact of fundamental shifts in human thinking and behavior, an 
analogue to the French Revolution and the moment of literary history that counterpoints it, 
Romanticism.  
 I want to call attention to one such shift in human thinking and behavior: the clash and 
pressure that occurs when writing about Shelley and Freud. It has its roots in two very different 
lines of reasoning: on the one hand, the question of what it means to be traditional or progressive, 
                                                
5 Freud makes the distinction between erotic and procreant love. The term “economics” 
employs exchange values for each. One must pay dearly to the other in satisfying the 
demands of the pleasure-seeking ego. 
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and who, whether a poet like Shelley, or psychical theorist like Freud, best equips his audience 
with the knowledge to interpret their terms and our interpretive terms for them. On the other 
hand, and independent of all speculative spheres, whether traditional or modern, scientific or 
philosophical, the question of what is being tested when we say “science,” or “philosophy,” 
“history” or “psychological,” “traditional” or “modern.” What we discover is two vastly 
different ways of understanding the mental life of human existence: the one seeks a reconciliation 
of consistently diverging pieces into a whole, the other a whole that justifies itself in consistently 
diverging pieces. I call this binary opposition history versus psyche.  To call this situation a 
clash of two “isms,” or some pressurized aneurism waiting to puncture into the remote sphere of 
the mind, or great thinkers enjoined by the very thing all great thinkers wish to conquer and 
reduce, the temporal, is to suggest somehow that the projects of Shelley and Freud demonstrate 
its collision. This is not the case; in fact, one could say that my choice to collide these two 
perspectives from the bi-polarity of Shelley’s thought to Freud’s only bears on the tendency to 
keep appointments we don’t remember making. However, because I see a clash of historical and 
psychological notions of discourse happening between the whole and the many pieces that make 
it up, drawing out its presence in Shelley and Freud seems a good enough occasion to argue that 
our notion of History is nothing other than a temporary dominance of one mental process over 
another.  
 Shelley’s decision to leave England for a nation that better conformed to his radical and 
revolutionary wishes parallels a mental need to free himself from the temporal demands of chance 
and necessity; he substitutes an undesirable relationship between the individual and his 
civilization with a poetic one. Prometheus Unbound records this substitution, but what merits 
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attention to Shelley’s achievement and affects our own departure toward the twenty-first 
century is that this substitution turns out to be a re-duplication. He wishes both himself and 
civilization to be “[f]rom custom’s evil taint exempt and pure” (PU III.iv.155). Both the weight 
and waiting of example and experience reveal in Shelley an aesthetics that wishes to be freed from 
custom, a wish born out of a need to live beyond history and politics. I think this explains the 
powerful monistic tendency in Shelley, as if each distinct and individuated poem prolongs the 
mind’s exposure to the One poem; this prolongation which the writing of poetry affords also 
serves as protection from the mind’s complete absorption, and therefore annihilation, into the 
One poem. The Defense of Poetry is just this: a simultaneous prolongation and delay of the 
evolutionary development of what Shelley self-consciously calls participation in the “eternal, the 
infinite and the one” (513). In its pursuit, he must draw from a source of great anxiety and 
unhappiness; he must invoke and sanction the very antithesis of “this indestructible order” 
Poetry, Chaos. And not surprisingly, the embodiment of chaos for Shelley discovers itself in 
Prometheus in a figure of much disputed entity in the poem: Demogorgon. Because of the 
impossibility of this ideal, gratifying within poetic discourse a wish that can only always be a 
reality at the end of poetic discourse, the desire and attempt to both recover and defend against 
the demands of this ideal gives shape to the main conflict of the poem, which is madness. This 
dramatic tension plays itself out in the reader’s mind, which mirrors it back as a choice that 
values one attempt to reconcile and interpret the conflict, love and all that threatens and is 
opposed to it, over another.  
 Prometheus Unbound is a poem conceived and composed in exile. From fall 1818 to 
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winter 1819, Shelley wrote Prometheus in Italy.6 Several themes play this exile out in the poem, 
each tethered to the idea of the Family Romance. However, one consequence of exile presses 
itself more consistently throughout the poem than any other: repudiation. This repudiation takes 
on several guises, the most refined of which is artistic creation. One model of interpretation, then, 
for Prometheus Unbound is drawn forth from Shelley’s need to recreate a world unthreatened by 
cultural demands while exiled. Adherence to custom, politics and history drive these demands. 
Turning away from them toward oneself shores the line of demarcation between the pleasure 
seeking ego and external world that threatens its access to pleasure.  
 Freud speaks of the hermit’s method of repudiation against failed attempts to find 
happiness in society, who performs the role of exile:  
  One can try and re-create the world, to build up in its stead another world   
  in which its most unbearable features are eliminated and replaced by others  
  that are in conformity with one’s own wishes. (Civilization and its    
  Discontents 31) 
 That the figure Prometheus is in possession of a great power at the poem’s beginning is 
without question. The story tells us that Jupiter’s sphere of influence ends where Prometheus’s 
psychological constitution begins; Prometheus has given Jupiter control of the Earth and cosmos, 
but not of himself. He is barred, through the exercise of his great will, from satisfying vital 
physical needs. In his great contempt for Jupiter, the Father and Patriarch of this poem, he 
sacrifices to a single reproach in the form of a curse the physical liberty of not only himself but 
                                                
6 Donald H. Reiman and Neil Fraistat, eds. Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, 202.  
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also the human race; Prometheus re-creates the world by repudiating it. This repudiation, a denial 
of the Father, is the first stage, a necessary one, in the evolution of unbinding Prometheus, and 
also the primitive and infantile in human thought. One senses a stubborn child reproaching the 
unreasonable demands of an overbearing Father in the opening speech of the drama. And, like a 
stubborn and frustrated child, Prometheus sees his present condition as a permanent one: “Ah 
me, alas, pain, pain ever, forever!” (I.22). Of course, Shelley did not share this bleak view of 
things, who maintained all creative gestures of mankind, aesthetic, political or scientific or 
otherwise, constitute and reflect the eternal poem from which all such gestures derive.7 One could 
even speculate the poem itself is the attempted suicide of this “pain ever, forever.”  
 Prometheus Unbound begins by trying to seize hold of a great loss. Prometheus tries to 
remember what he said before the poem, the words that now bind him. The goal of this 
recollection is to depose Jupiter, and the physical force that legitimizes his rule. As the action of 
the poem demonstrates, this authority and the fear that attaches to it resist all external threats. In 
order to remove Jupiter’s supremacy over the phenomenal world, which constitutes both the 
source from which authority claims power and the fear of punishment that authority 
incorporates into individuals, Prometheus turns away from physical defenses toward mental 
ones. At play is an interrogation into the origin of the mental slavery in which we first see 
Prometheus. Reading the conflict between Prometheus and Jupiter at the beginning of the play as 
an expression and occasion for the recreation of a world undisturbed by history and the 
implacability of custom is just one model of interpretation, and a very literal one. The infantile 
need for a father’s protection is a manifestation of a much deeper feeling pursued by the ego. The 
                                                
7 Defense of Poetry. 1821. 
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poem moves toward this deeper feeling, and tries repeatedly to articulate it. The fourth act is 
largely devoted to exalting this sense and feeling into a historical ideal driven by a political 
program of love. The first act, in sharp contrast, works as both a lament to this singular and 
unitary state of consciousness and, at the same time, a sanguinary plea for a future where the 
inner and outer life of mankind is not itself already divided into separate aims. “[O]riginally the 
ego includes everything,” Freud tells us, “later it separates off an external world from itself” 
(Civilization and its Discontents 15).  
 If a mind hopes to successfully negotiate both the demands and advances of culture, there 
must be a clear and stable delineation between experience and its interpretation, individual and 
society. Inevitably, however, the contest of Markers who dispute the authenticity and legitimacy 
of governing powers always threatens the rational of the mark; it therefore fails to remove the 
original, but always present, longing for the union of experience and its interpretation, individual 
and society. If individuals will achieve happiness in society, they must both submit to its laws 
and participate in the customs and values that sustain its history. The appointment that Shelley 
makes with culture in Prometheus Unbound rests on the assumption that ego interests can be 
satisfied outside of the ego, but Shelley’s poem keeps telling us this is not the case. If it were, 
then Prometheus need not pay attention to Jupiter’s tyranny, his forgotten curse that sustains it, 
the new world visible beyond the horizon of Demogorgon’s deed. Prometheus, after all, tells 
Jupiter’s phantasm that “Thou art Omnipotent. / O’er all things but thyself I gave thee power, / 
And my own will” (I.272-3). Subject to horrific physical punishment, Prometheus nevertheless 
claims a liberty inaccessible to Jupiter.  
 If Love is nearer the province of will than force, then why does Shelley take the poem 
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beyond the first act?; why the political revolution?; why the combat with history, custom, 
everything social? Because Shelley writes in the preface, we are all “in one sense the creators and 
in another the creations of [our] age”; because of conscience, quite simply, that element within 
mental life which most resembles the extraneous world without (208). Maybe it is not what 
Prometheus Unbound keeps telling us but what we, as critical readers, keep telling it that fails to 
arrive at its destination and renders the reading experience unreadable.  
 The competing interests of human desire and the process of human development as a 
mass that seeks to check that desire, produces a discord against which ego interests retreat as 
civilization presses them further inward, a civilization that at the very same time promises to 
harmonize this discord. Civilization plays off the originary and absolute harmony experienced by 
the ego when it included everything. Because the memory of this perfect pleasure, as Freud 
notes, does not altogether vanish from the mind as the reality principle presses upon it, but both 
anticipates its recovery and fixates on its absence, therefore ruining the quality that governs its 
perfection, its memory operates like history. History is the name we give to perpetual discord, 
and Culture, our need to harmonize it. The ruins of memory, of which history comprises, Shelley 
anticipates and wishes to bring into the present fury of pure being, eliminate, through the 
execution of Prometheus Unbound. It comprehends the preface’s declaration of men as creators 
and creations, expressing itself as a need to escape this “lofty subjection,” history, which, in the 
poem, is itself already historical (208). Shelley does not disguise or complicate his reasons for 
desiring unhistory, but clearly sets them forth in three prose pieces, “On Love,” “On Life,” and 
Defense of Poetry.  
 A lot is said and implied in the opening sentence of “On Love”: “What is Love?—Ask 
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him who lives what is life; ask him who adores what is God” (503). Shelley chooses to 
understand Love, an idea we attach to a very powerful emotion, as signifying a much more 
profound and procreant feeling, which brings with it the possibility of emotional experience. He 
also suggests that Love is somehow different from life and God. Shelley does not ask someone 
who lives, as “him who lives,” or adores, as “him who adores,” love to define it because Love, 
according to Shelley, provides the possibility of answering all questions if Love can conform to 
the pragmatic applications of society, or if such applications are willing to conform to Love’s 
ideals. Not only does Prometheus Unbound resist this possibility up until its last word, 
“Victory,”8 but also Shelley’s prose language inadvertently precludes it. Shelley endeavors to 
settle the debt he owes to Love for its gift; in exchange for which Shelley gives up, quits his claim 
to desire, ego-interests. But what provides the rational for such loss? For Shelley, Love construes 
itself as “discovery of [an] antitype” (504). In “On Love,” Shelley calls this antitype “a 
miniature as it were of our entire self […] the ideal prototype of every thing excellent or lovely 
that we are capable of conceiving as belonging to the nature of man” (504). From this definition of 
antitype we can begin to talk about Otherness in Prometheus Unbound, alterity, what Freud calls 
the “uncanny,” an encounter with something or someone who, unfamiliar to the ego, surprises 
and provokes within it a powerful sense of estrangement. However, the sense of estrangement is 
                                                
8 The poem concludes with this passage, delivered by Demogorgon: “Neither to change 
nor falter nor repent: / This, like thy glory, Titan! Is to be / Good, great and joyous, 
beautiful and free; / This is alone Life, Joy, Empire and Victory.” One wonders what 
Shelley was about giving Chaos the final words. Whether a careless concluding utterance, 
or the decision of a poet who stands in awe of what he has composed, and realizing the 
debt he owes to Thanatos, the Freudian Death drive, which is itself a slave to Ananke, 
Necessity, or, more appropriately, I think, Chaos, Shelley concedes defeat and redeems 
us by betraying us to “eternity,” the mental concept Demogorgon offers as his name. 
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not so much genuine and literal as latent, since the uncanny experience situates itself in familiars, 
in things that we understand as the same to ourselves. The someone or something else of the 
uncanny is almost always another way of looking at ourselves, our things. 
 Derrida suggests that what we mean by Other is another way of looking at Self. And his 
comments originate in Freud:  
  […] just as psychoanalysis aims to teach us that, beside the Id and the Superego,  
  there is an Ego or a Me, in the same way psychoanalysis as the psychic structure  
  of a collective identity is composed of instances that can be called Id, Superego,  
  and Ego. Far from setting us adrift in a vague analogism, the figure of this relation  
  will tell us more about the terms of their analogical relation than any simple  
  internal inspection of their content.9 (136) 
If the ideas and terms we use to understand the psyche lead us to a “collective identity” of the 
Unconscious, and also to “instances” of it, then it seems to suggest that history is always an 
uncanny structure insofar as it is always heterogeneous and collective. In this view, there is never 
a We of history, only a Me, and if the randomness of chance dictates that “I” did not get to 
experience this or that instance of it firsthand, then the Me of the psyche has no other choice but 
to textualize and internalize it into the psyche, reading it into a real experience, so to speak. 
Everything we never experience but know about becomes historicized in this way; it becomes 
uncanny because of its familiarity, but it is familiar to us not because we experienced it in its 
present moment, or instance, but because we forget to historicize it as a familiar process of the 
psyche. Making of Prometheus Unbound an analogy between a psyche that forgets what was 
                                                
9 Derrida, Jacques. Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume I.  
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once known to an instance once experienced explains the complicated structure of the poem. 
Shelley recalls more than Prometheus’s curse to liberate him, but also his Id and Superego, his 
history.    
 However, before I closely read passages in the poem that stage this encounter with the 
uncanny, showing how Freud’s 1919 eponymous essay on the subject carries the poem’s 
discourse into futurity, I must make mention of Freud’s superego, which Shelley’s “antitype” 
anticipates. Thomas Weiskel, in The Romantic Sublime, draws the analogy from what he 
identifies Shelley’s “fear of identity” with Freud’s superego (148). He says, “[i]dentity is an 
inverse function of desire, a secondary precipitate which coalesces as narcissistic desire fails or is 
betrayed”10 (148). Because Love implicates identity in its failure to discover its own perfected 
version of itself, Love duplicates Law—at this moment, and during its iterations, Shelley’s 
rhetoric extinguishes the meaning it repeatedly gestures toward. The process reproduces itself in 
Prometheus Unbound when, in act three, Demogorgon descends to his cave with Jupiter his 
prisoner, as Prometheus is physically Jupiter’s in act one. Weiskel mentions that Shelley’s 
poetry “move[s] into dialogue with […] a nonerotic ideal, a kind of superego,” a description that 
ornaments Shelley’s “ideal prototype” with political impact and historical significance, since the 
superego emerges in response to civilization’s effort to control individual aggression. Freud 
compares the superego to conscience, a mental category that, like authority, always works to 
subdue; in fact, I read the superego as external Law’s proxy in Law’s aspiration to become a fixed 
premise of human action, subject to the needs of the public sphere. Weiskel’s “nonerotic ideal” 
means one realized in death, working against Eros, and for which civilization well prepares 
                                                
10 Weiskel, Thomas. The Romantic Sublime.  
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individuals because, unlike the ego, as Freud notes, civilization can evolve and progress without 
paying attention to happiness.  
 Whether Shelley makes the case for his antitype originating inside or outside the self is 
unclear. If Love is “discovery of antitype,” then which discovery we call our own ever occurs 
outside of the mind’s interpretive reach? Shelley’s antitype, it seems, because the discovery 
reveals and names what was already always there, the “ideal prototype.” But the introduction of 
another, whose mental life we can never really be sure of but whose existence we nonetheless 
require to satisfy the social demands of human life, outside a Shellyean discourse on Love, 
deteriorates into a reminder that everything “belonging to the nature of man” is not owned by 
man. Simple knowledge of the discrepancy, conversing with others about the mysteries of 
philosophy and science, Society, generally, brings Shelley no closer to the fulfillment of his wish; 
instead, the opposite occurs, and when he tries to unburden his soul to another, he finds his 
“language misunderstood like one in a distant and savage land” (503). We find a correlative with 
the geographic and psychological compositions of Prometheus Unbound in the use of “distant” 
and “savage.” The economics of exile dictates a simultaneous turning away from one culture and 
turning toward another, which calls for a reshaping of it by the ego in satisfying the demands 
made in the name of culture. Shelley’s poem is an expression of this need to create an 
autonomous standard of measurement for what he calls in the preface “beautiful idealisms of 
moral excellence” (209). The misunderstood language to which he refers in “On Love” is the 
enigmatic form and composition, the wrought theatrical aestheticism of the lyrical drama, 
Prometheus Unbound. If the poem arrives at the destination to which its preface aims, then the 
invocation of a “beautiful idealism of moral excellence” becomes an elite icon of worship for its 
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aspirants, yet for the majority of mankind whose vision the poem seeks to expand, a 
misunderstood language, distant and uncontrollable.   
           I argue for Shelley’s ingenuousness in the preface, but hope to explain one of its principle 
inconsistencies. I mean that Shelley, regardless the degree of self-consciousness, also and at the 
same time he exalts “beautiful idealisms of moral excellence” in the poem’s preface, directly 
threatens both their potency and potentialization. Something remains in excess at the end of the 
poem, inerasable. This overflow and undesired extraneous part of the poem is history, the past, 
which presses on the presence of the autonomous poem and the poet’s unconscious impressions, 
both internal and external, which produced it. The fourth act of the poem can be read as attempt 
to escape the dialectic of history and events. Shelley reaches beyond the triad of thesis, antithesis 
and synthesis in search of excess, and the result is at times unreadable. But though the fourth act 
might be unreadable in terms of the three acts that precede it, this is precisely the point. Excess 
has no claim to precedence or eventual realization to future. The emotion that attaches itself to 
the demands of excess is terror. The poem’s failure to mimetically represent in both form and 
strength the mind’s first vision of it creates this terror and is the expression of it. This terror 
carries forward the memory of the original vision of the poem into the present; without it, the 
creative source of the poet dies, and so we can say that terror divides one half of Shelley’s 
procreant urge; the other half is Love. Both coexist alongside each other in the mind, legitimized 
in the difference between Prometheus Unbound and Shelley’s original vision of it. Excess of love, 
like the excess we name “history,” unburdens itself in the aesthetic object, but it must battle 
against being historicized, literally ruined by its contrary. In the Defense of Poetry, Shelley 
universalizes this potential for love, which, as we shall see in Prometheus Unbound, becomes the 
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excess that marks its origin:  
  Every man, in the infancy of art, observes an order which approximates   
  more or less closely to that from which this highest delight results: but the   
  diversity is not sufficiently marked, as that its gradations should be   
  sensible, except in those instances where the predominance of this faculty   
  of approximation to the beautiful (for so we may be permitted to name the  
  relation between this highest pleasure and its cause) is very great. Those in  
  whom it exists in excess are poets, in the most universal sense of the word  
  [.] (512) 
 This passage demands close attention because its meaning hinges, like Prometheus 
Unbound, on Love’s transformation into a mental faculty while orbiting a remote enough distance 
from the ego, as superego, to satisfy the powerful need for a singular ideal. Love for both Shelley 
and Freud plays a god-like role in this process. Love, as they understand it, is anterior to all good 
action, inhibited or uninhibited, and to all bad action gradations of its absence. In each writer, the 
idea of love offers a compelling choice for how to account for the persistence of a lost condition 
of wholeness. Memory carries the remains of private experience, that which we call past, and 
writing public experience, what we call history. Love in Prometheus Unbound is the reason this 
memory of perfect sense and feeling remains, and determines the natural and civic qualities of 
these remains. But in acts three and four, particularly, as Prometheus “unbinds,” so to speak, 
Love takes on an entirely different quality than in act one and two. The poem helps show us the 
cost of Love. Beauty is now the object and subject of approximation, since he who loves is 
necessarily beautiful. The poet purchases “this highest pleasure”—approximation to the 
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beautiful—from literally loving beauty in exchange for bearing it “in excess.” Distributed across 
the best minds of a generation, like a powerful sensory organ present in “poets,” according to 
Shelley, and no one else, this excess drives cultural change because it departs from culture.  
 This departure threatens the logic of the established order in three ways. First, instead of 
trying to destroy customs, and the values and events on which they rest, the excess seeks to 
reinterpret them according to an “approximation to the beautiful.” So this first method of attack 
is both historical, in that it “legislates” another event, and ahistorical, in that it seeks to escape its 
own ruin as a legislated product bound to political history. Secondly, because Shelley’s use of 
excess universalizes the “poet” in whom it exists, who can then “legislate” the world, it 
complicates the boundary line between individual ego interests and those of society, and 
therefore deligitimizes both extraneous authority and the signature “poet.” And finally, Love 
bridges this excess to imagination and brings it forth into the social community (535).  
 The influence of Shelleyan excess in moving culture forward into futurity and arriving at 
its meeting with history ready to repudiate and therefore historicize it, determines the action of 
Prometheus Unbound and accounts for the inadequate distribution of its impact across literary 
history. One could understand the direction of this departure as always turning in relation to 
reason and imagination, and what these ideas gain for Shelley’s poetic discourse. Again, this 
contest stages itself in a confrontation between Demogorgon and Jupiter, but to first identify the 
process of its development in the Defense extends the reach of Shelley’s thoughts on poetry and 
culture.11 In the first act, a fury says, “In each human heart, terror survives / The ravin it has 
                                                
11 Shelley puts into play three different concepts in the Defense that name, but do not 
necessarily determine the reality of Prometheus, Jupiter and Demogorgon: imagination, 
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gorged,” two lines that demand rigorous and sensitive reading (618-20). The pun on “ravin” is 
more important than it at first appears. One way to read ravin is “plunder, booty, spoils; that 
which is taken or seized.”12 Here terror becomes a product of ravin, the psychological remnants 
of a thing expressed in an emotion. If we read ravin as an act of “rapine or robbery; a plundering, 
a pillaging,” then ravin becomes an event, and terror its interpretation.13 This would suggest that 
terror is a motivating force in the carrying out of ravin, even always anterior to it. The paranoia 
and morbidity that clouds Jupiter’s reign in the poem converges to a point of terror, and force 
always follows; in fact, force impregnates the “terrorist” with a built-in warrant for its 
application because physical force will always only terrorize those who wield it, or at least 
Prometheus Unbound suggests. There is only one physical act of terror in the whole poem: 
Demogorgon’s carefully structured and measured ascent to Jupiter, Jupiter’s evacuation of 
power, symbol and control, and Demogorgon’s equally structured and measured descent back to 
his throne in the deep. Prometheus, though the subject of physical torture for three thousand 
years, avoids the mental disturbance of Jupiter. Prometheus comes close to despair, but never 
terror.  
 Reading ravin as an event, and terror as the interpretation of it, the knowledge left over 
from the event’s happening, suggests Shelley understands that the price of history is terror, since 
                                                                                                                                            
reason, utility. By studying the interplay between reason, imagination and utility, one 
maps out the psychological structure of Prometheus Unbound and the language that 
charts its limits. Shelleyean Love names Asia, but operates throughout the whole poem, 
its presence or absence consistently identified.    
Poets, then, in Shelley’s view, cannot choose to vacate the public sphere, since their 
existence legitimizes it. 
 
12 OED, 2nd ed. 1989. 
13 Ibid. 
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history seeks to record the discord and conflict between political subject and State (the ego and 
everything extraneous to it). This marks a critical distinction between history and poetry. For 
Shelley, poetry is the “record of the best and happiest moments of the happiest and best minds” 
(532). This definition clearly anticipates the aim of the pleasure principle’s program, happiness, 
and would seem to oppose the ruin that historicity consolidates.  
 Shelley’s 1816 lyric, Mont Blanc, offers another reading of the lines, “In each human 
heart, terror survives / The ravin it has gorged.” In this poem, one begins to see how the pattern 
of Shelley’s thought pulls external reality downward toward the region that Demogorgon will 
inhabit in Prometheus. The Thou of Mont Blanc, also the mountain Mont Blanc is not Europe’s 
highest peak but “ravine”: “Thus Thou, Ravine of Arve—dark, deep Ravine” (12).14 Fifteen lines 
below in the second of five stanzaic breaks, the speaker says:  
                                              the strange sleep  
  Which when the voices of the desart fail  
  Wraps all in its own deep eternity.15 (27-9) 
 The “strange sleep” is not death, but something like a living death, a vampyric veil that so 
subtly insulates a feeling of meaning from the “swaddling clothes” of Luke and reorders it into a 
“deep eternity.”  If we read ravin as a “deep narrow gorge or cleft,” then we meet Freud at the 
place where he metaphorizes depth as conscience, the vast interiority to which the ego descends 
                                                
14 No doubt the debt this poem owes to Coleridge’s Kubla Khan has been exhausted, but 
whereas Coleridge builds from his imagination a pleasure dome, the developmental 
process utilized in Mont Blanc proceeds from its ruins, a mental conceit that seems to 
attribute imagination, perhaps ironically, to Natural entities outside its compass. 
15 Read Yeats “The Second Coming.” Yeats’s Poetry, Drama, and Prose, 76. 
   
 27 
when pressed by society.16 Although reading the superego into ravin might seem arbitrary, I 
think it is an accurate vocabulary in which to begin, since I will show how ravin essentially 
consumes itself. This reading legitimizes many of the psychological assumptions of this thesis, 
and makes full use of a brief passage from the Defense in which Shelley reveals in basic terms the 
nature of his thought and poetry: “Poetry, and the principle of Self, of which money is the 
visible incarnation, are the God and the Mammon of the world” (531).   
 Shelley’s placement of caesura, which leaves hanging for the reader “terror survives,” and 
his use of enjambment, which drives the sentence toward “gorged,” reflects the rhetorical and 
thematic impact of both lines and, in at least one respect, Prometheus Unbound: in Jupiter’s 
world, Mammon’s, individuals cannibalize themselves in pursuit of “the principle of Self.” The 
ravin, or ravine, exists to be sated, “gorged.” Love for Shelley lays claim to a certain individual 
limitlessness, which poetry always seeks to outline, trace and define in order to match it, equal 
its source. In a similar way, the principle of Self lays claim to an analogous limitlessness, a depth 
whose operations mirror Freud’s id and whose appearance terrorizes both the individual in whom 
it exists and the society at which it directs contempt. Shelley calls its visible incarnation in the 
world “money,” from which we conclude the principle of Self is economic materialism, and the 
relationship between Materialism and Individual is ownership. Jupiter owns one face of human 
existence, things. The apparatus of this ownership is Law, and its force comes in the service of 
things; Jupiter’s Law protects property. Because Jupiter understands Prometheus as a piece of 
property only, a slave, he cannot access the other face of existence, Poetry, as Shelley calls it in 
the Defense, but when Shelley mentions Prometheus’s tremendous will in the poem, he is talking 
                                                
16 OED, 2nd ed., 1989. 
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about the same idea of liberty.  
 The distinction between Jupiter as master and Prometheus as slave complicates itself in 
what can be construed as Jupiter’s sincere concern for Prometheus as property, albeit property 
too expensive to own. This is to say that in one respect Jupiter’s interest, like Prometheus’s, 
best serve them by canceling terror’s appointment with ravin: quite simply, terror must not gorge 
ravin. If the insatiate desires that comprise Shelley’s “principle of Self” terrorize the human heart 
with hate, avarice and violence, then what vanishes is hope. What rouses Prometheus from 
inaction, and occasions the repudiation of his curse is exactly this: civilization, as Shelley knows 
it during the composition of Prometheus, distributes its institutions and controls individuals 
according to the “principle of Self.” A titan in the poem, Prometheus is a poetic representative of 
the best and worst in human potential; an image of human perfection Prometheus is not, nor did 
Shelley intend him. Narcissism, like the raven, feeds off what is already dead. We see a defeated 
figure in the opening speech of the poem not because Jupiter is too strong but Prometheus too 
weak; “[b]lack, wintry, dead, unmeasured,” as Prometheus names the terms of the contract to 
which hate binds him(I.21). The eagle that gnaws and disgraces him in the first scene is a reminder 
of the ravin in his heart.   
 In which ways does Shelley’s “principle of Self” threaten Jupiter, however? 
 I mentioned above three concepts at work in Defense of Poetry: reason, imagination and 
utility, and how we might read them as abstract models for Jupiter, Prometheus and 
Demogorgon. Shelley’s mythopoeia borrows from diverse use of classical mythology, offering 
ready-made plots that he adapts to his purposes, the most important of which prophesizes the 
outcome of Jupiter’s union with Thetis. Mercury informs Prometheus of this knowledge in act 
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one: “There is a secret known / To thee and to none else of living things / Which may transfer the 
scepter of wide Heaven” (371-3). Mercury tells Prometheus that knowledge of this prophecy 
“perplexes the Supreme,” who will do anything to avoid it; Jupiter, in fact, marries Thetis to 
Peleus, a mortal, to ensure their offspring poses no threat to his authority. Not Achilles, however 
(son of Thetis and Peleus), but Demogorgon regulates Jupiter’s fate, gorged into existence 
following the rape of his mother. In Prometheus Unbound Civilization is broken beyond man’s 
capacity to repair it (hence humanity’s surface removal from the poem’s action, replaced by a 
greater agent of change, a Titan, Prometheus); indeed, broken perhaps beyond even divine 
restoration and redemption, and only terror survives each human heart, history’s ruin. 
Demogorgon is Shelley’s response to the fall of man.  
 To say that Jupiter’s force gorges Demogorgon into the poem’s realm, or sphere, would 
do more than point to a homophonous relationship of words; it, in a like manner, forces us to 
proceed from a new reading, one that suggests not only Demogorgon’s birth but also the birth of 
a new realm, or sphere which names itself “Eternity” (III.ii.52). Demogorgon would seem to 
represent Utility, or necessity, in Prometheus Unbound; and unsurprisingly so, for he names 
himself “eternity,” and is not subject to any index of mutability. The whole structure of 
Prometheus Unbound erects itself in him and from him, this “One” whom Shelley introduces and 
sets above all others in the second line of the poem: “Monarch of Gods and Daemons, and all 
Spirits / But One, who throng those bright and rolling Worlds” (emphasis mine). It was, I think, 
Shelley’s understanding of historical development, in which what we create as “cause” signifies 
nothing but a “word expressing a certain state of the human mind with regard to the manner in 
which two thoughts [[things]] are apprehended to be related to each other,” which led to his 
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decision to invent Demogorgon (“On Life,” 508). In addition, Shelley’s conception of history 
largely has to do with “Mutability,” to which he addressed and entitled a short poem published 
in 1816. The poem leaves the reader with “Nought may endure but Mutability,” except for the 
strange “may” to which rises the first iamb (16). What this suggests is that for Shelley, at least, 
and in Prometheus Unbound, particularly, Love and Necessity, individual and society; or, echoed 
in Civilization and its Discontents, Eros and Ananke, do not exist in a causal or sequential 
relationship but coexist with each other as radials issuing from an unknown center -- unknown 
always. Love and Necessity are always being birthed, and always simultaneously. Jupiter’s 
prophesized fate is certain, whether he could have escaped it, irrelevant; that he chooses to rape 
Thetis and set in motion the prophecy is at once a procreative (Demogorgon’s birth) and 
destructive (the decision is suicide) act—“Nought may endure but Mutability” (emphasis mine). 
My reasoning here echoes Freud’s toward the end of Civilization and its Discontents:  
  The two processes of individual and cultural development must stand in   
  hostile  opposition to each other and mutually dispute the ground. But this  
  struggle between the individual and society is not a derivative of the   
  contradiction—probably an irreconcilable one—between the primal   
  instincts of Eros and death. (106) 
Freud asserts that the struggle derives from “within the economics of the libido,” and represents a 
dispute that “does admit of eventual accommodation in the individual,” and he then expresses the 
same wish for civilization (106).  
 I mention this to suggest that the symptoms and conflicts of culture and the public sphere 
are, at bottom, symptoms and conflicts of the psyche, the individual mind. The social customs 
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for which Shelley professed so much contempt (Religion, Monarchy and Nationalism) inscribe 
themselves in the ego as obstructions to individual happiness. This is because they arise in the 
ego. Although the professional reader may, and should, make explicit the possible 
metaphorizations within reach of Prometheus in the poem, ranging from a representative of ideal 
man to ideal culture, Shelley still invests the dream of universal love of mankind in a single figure. 
Nor do I take this small point to be an outcome of the textual genesis of the title, in adherence to 
Aeschylus’s classical Promethean trilogy, but an illustration of the poem’s intended design. In 
showing his audience a titan, Shelley tries to show them their intellectual “miniature,” their “ideal 
prototype.” Nevertheless, this “ideal” psyche in whom Shelley places the redeemer’s burden 
comes to resemble the much more common and conflicted one: the psyche who is already and 
always in one sense a “creator” and in another a “creation” of his age.    
 I want to iterate the centrality of that omnipotent feeling of wholeness at which the ego 
aims in its search for pleasure, happiness and perfection. The psychological imagery of the poem 
works in concert with this aim, as Shelley tells us in the preface, emphasizing the human mind as 
the scene of the drama: “The imagery I have employed will be found in many instances to have 
been drawn from the human mind, or from those external actions by which they are expressed” 
(207). in the poem Shelley demystifies the terror of the unfamiliar. Engaging psychological 
discourses will not foster a reconciliation of Shelley’s relationship to literary history; such critical 
treatments stand alongside traditional Shelleyean oppositions (as one critic puts it, “an other-
worldly naïf versus an Anarco-activist”)17 and the theories to which readers attach them. I offer 
an analogy of the psychological struggle Shelley stages in Prometheus Unbound to Freud’s 
                                                
17 Duffy, Cian. Shelly and the Revolutionary Sublime.  
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theory of the relationship of individuals to society, not to show that Shelley is more politically 
determined as a poet-“legislator” than aesthetically so, as aspirant of Adonais, or vice versa. One 
does not require Freud to say that both politics and aesthetics run parallel in Shelley’s 
apprehension of things, or that Shelley is more politically determined as a poet-“legislator” than 
aesthetically so, as aspirant of Adonais. Nor does one require Freudian theory to make the case 
that psychology performs an important role in Shelley’s poetry and prose; nor to argue 
Romantic poetry’s obsession with the imagination resembles Modernity’s relationship to the 
unconscious.  
 I want to impress upon the reader and remind the reader of what Shelley says in the 
preface of Prometheus Unbound: “The imagery I have employed will be found in many instances 
to have been drawn from the human mind, or from those external actions by which they are 
expressed” (207). The province of poetry belongs to Psyche, and psyche to Other, so poetry is 
fundamentally a pathological disturbance of the limits between ego and object, self and other, 
event and history; there is one exception, however, which I’ve already cited—Love. According to 
Freud and Shelley, poetry without Love is always already the taking of curses rather than the 
giving of blessings; but of course it is both already always. The psychological operations from 
which we apprehend our perceptions and perceive our apprehensions, ideas of history, 
modernity, futurity begin and end in the mental sphere; their coherence and transmission comes 
later in grammatical edifices and figures of speech, which are precisely what Prometheus, Jupiter 
and Demogorgon are figures of speech, Shelley’s, Freud’s and our own.  
 Defining the exchange that Prometheus Unbound dramatizes, and that Freud exposes, 
shows the mind in conflict with itself. Our defenses against a reality indifferent to our perpetual 
   
 33 
demise are limited, but our uncertainties which are boundless and exert upon us their strength in 
this material unborn existence of reality. In the next chapter I explain the terror of becoming just 
another thing in the world, just a momentary event, an object of historical ruin. Shelley answers 
the absurdity of this fear in Prometheus Unbound, a vision born from chaos. Freud passes it 
along to our contemporaneity and we foolishly call him a psychologist when he is, quite the 
contrary, one of the great poets of the twentieth century. The poem Prometheus and Freud’s 
exiled annihilation from nativity abides the pieces of its ruin in order to admit and then dismiss 
the procreant wish for wholeness; poetry must historicize its love, love its history.  
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Chapter Two 
 Perchance no thought can count them—yet they pass.  
 —Prometheus (PU I.424) 
   
 The poem Prometheus Unbound is uncanny from its first words: Prometheus Unbound, 
A Lyrical Drama in Four Acts. Freud defines this term in the eponymous essay, The Uncanny, 
ascribing it special status as an obscure species of Aesthetics. He writes:  
 If psychoanalytic theory is right in asserting that every affect arising form an 
emotional impulse—whatever—is converted into fear by being repressed, it 
follows that among those things that are felt to be frightening there must be one 
group in which it can be shown that the frightening element is something that has 
been repressed and now returns. This species of the frightening would then 
constitute the uncanny, and it would be immaterial whether it was itself originally 
frightening or arose from another affect. In the second place, if this really is the 
secret nature of the uncanny, we can understand why German usage allows the 
familiar (das Heimliche, the ‘homely’) to switch to its opposite, the uncanny” 
(147).  
Freud the modern Philosopher is to my understanding the best way to read him, the way which 
best delivers his theoretical project, and does not solicit the double bind of proceeding from the 
proposition that Freud is the “Father of Psycho-analytic interpretation,” wherein we as readers 
become another iteration of infantile helplessness, and our turn back to Freud, a substitutive 
satisfaction of paternal protection. The phrase comes from the first page of Freud’s The 
Uncanny: “Yet one may presume that there exists a specific affective nucleus, which justifies the 
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use of a special conceptual term.” The idea of an Affective nucleus exercises the Platonic, 
Lucretian and Goethean influence in Freud. One also finds an atomic motif in Shelley, and though 
the process by which Shelley’s amateurish scientific intent often extends its compass is 
thoroughly and lightly documented by Richard Holmes in the seminal 1976 literary biography, 
Shelley: The Pursuit, the occasional atomic phraseology Shelley turns in his poetry to stress 
parallel, though imaginative, processes in the poet’s mind is not produced by similarly intense 
Philosopher-Poet influences. Even so, Shelley draws from Plato, Lucretius and Goethe more 
explicitly than Freud does. One concern of aesthetics is, as Freud notes, everything “beautiful, 
attractive and sublime”; more profoundly, and negatively, however, is the “dread and horror,” the 
psyche’s “core” fear to which aesthetics seeks access. But the “uncanny” is familiar; it is home 
to us, so how is it possible for a mind to alienate itself from the very place to which it 
unintentionally is always returning? As I will show, Freud and Shelley arrive at the same problem 
and solution.  
 For a moment, I return to Shelley’s epigraph situated after the title and before the preface. 
Shelley carries himself, culture and us across the great design initiated by the Greek Tragedians, 
Aeschylus, particularly. Shelley’s audience for this play is, bluntly and aptly, a ghost, one with 
many selves and masques, some material, others only imaginary. The epigraph, “[d]o you hear 
me, Amphiarus, hidden away under the earth,” is not only a rhetorical question but also a literal 
one (emphasis mine). A footnote to Norton’s second edition of Shelley’s Poetry and Prose 
explains that the origin of this question lies in Cicero’s translation of a lost play by Aeschylus, 
Epigoni, who voiced it through Cleanthes’s address to Zeno as a bitter interrogative of the 
pleasure-seeking Dionysian lifestyle (206). So already this epigraph bears witness—hears—an 
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anticipation of Freud’s “Eternal City,” one that is both inside and out of language, which 
maintains the impossibility of matching historical sequence in mental images; the idea is self-
evident, yes, but worth mention because Shelley will never be Aeschylus, nor Prometheus 
Unbound an Attic drama. Yet also worth mentioning is that Shelley revives Aeschylus and Greek 
tragedy, so the case must also be made that what is so disturbing and perverse about this 
Prometheus is that we hear ourselves calling to Shelley buried beneath and hidden in the earth 
(the ocean, literally), as Prometheus does Demogorgon in the poem.  
 Yet if we read Freud sedulously, then we see he has already built into his assumptions 
and premises of memory, and what always was, an access and exit to the problem he posits in 
understanding how the primitive occupies the modern simultaneously in the preservation of the 
mental life of mankind: Imagination. I mentioned above Freud’s comparison of ancient to Modern 
Rome, but before the reader grants Freud permission to follow this line of reasoning, which 
reveals the entanglements and anxieties of the mind’s psychological preservation of memories, 
and the uncanny impressions and experiences this preservation excites, he first gains access to a 
key component, the only one, in my estimation, in order to demonstrate what repeatedly defeats 
such entanglements and anxieties—Imagination.18  
 Freud prefaces, like Shelley does in Prometheus Unbound, his fundamental point with an 
elitist and rarified documentation of what the “best” history is, and this complex interstice of 
                                                
18 Freud says in the long essay, The Uncanny, that its effects are produced by an 
encounter with our “double,” and that at first this other self was a defense against the 
annihilation of the body once its vital needs could no longer be met or satisfied. He 
explains: “having once been an assurance of immortality, it [Doppelgänger] becomes the 
uncanny harbinger of death (142). 
 
   
 37 
events, experiences and interpretations depend on the imaginative, though not pathological, 
celerity of the individual. The scaffolding and flying buttresses of Freud’s thought are levied on a 
contradiction of stained glass, literally and rhetorically. He comes close to saying outright that his 
major assumption put forth in Civilization and its Discontents falls apart like the ruins 
figuratively construing it. Freud contends:  
  Since we overcame the error of supposing that the forgetting we are  
  familiar with signified a destruction of the memory-trace—that is, its  
  annihilation—we have been inclined to take the opposite view, that in  
  mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish—that   
  everything is somehow preserved and that in suitable circumstances  
  (when, for instance, regression goes back far enough [say three thousand  
  years, for instance]) it can once more be brought to light. (16-7) 
 Supposing an inherent truth to this claim, we need only switch scientific principles with 
psychological ones, since what Freud does in the abovementioned passage is to define a natural 
law of physics. It is understood by science that the 1st Law of Thermodynamics states that 
matter, the thingness of ourselves Freud defends against annihilation, can be neither created nor 
destroyed but only transisted and transformed. One sees this displayed in Freud’s view of 
Religious doctrines and beliefs, an absurd infantilization that assures perpetual infancy by 
admitting a superior patriarchal figure, Aton, Moses, Christ, Jahve, Allah, Demogorgon, etc. 
Shelley shares Freud’s assessment of religion but cannot seem to discard the notion of a 
Universal Oneness; but really it is us as poor readers of Shelley who do not listen when he tells 
us in the Defense that Oneness is simply the condition of battle and mark of faith of an 
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enlightened individual who exalts the many over the one.  
 A similar instance of the inanity that blooms from each generation of critics to the next is 
present in the opening sentence of Civilization and its Discontents, in which Freud tells us, “It is 
impossible to escape the impression that people commonly use false standards of measurement 
[…]” (10). This is an ironic claim for several reasons, least of which is the fact that Freud’s 
measurements are anything but common; 2) escaping the “impossible” is what Religion, and 
Freud (though he uses “error” instead of sin, tells us is possible; 3) the term “common” is so 
relative that after reading Freud’s tome, one begins to believe that there exists only the common 
alongside the singularity of Freud. Shelley of course employs a similar rhetorical trick when he 
writes in the preface to Prometheus Unbound, “[d]idactic poetry is my abhorrence,” his stated 
purpose is to “familiarize the highly refined imagination of the more select classes of poetical 
readers with beautiful idealisms of moral excellence” (209). I want to iterate the intangible quality 
of “highly refined imagination” and the physical notion of what is to us “familiar,” not because 
Shelley and Freud’s thoughts are identical, but they are distributed across their texts similarly.  
 That Shelley wishes to “familiarize” a select audience would seem counterintuitive 
alongside Wordsworth’s ardent request to bring poetry from the ethereal sphere, to the common 
tongue of common man and common speech, back to iambic pentameter. But even Wordsworth is 
not literally pleading for this; like Wordsworth, and Freud after him, who seek in a “common” 
tongue a natural man, one uninhibited by the demands of culture and punishment of Law, Shelley 
makes of his poem a document that shows us what we are not, so that his s/elect readers are 
addressed not as possessors of intellectual and spiritual acumen; but its opposite, an ordinary, 
terrified and therefore blood-bespackled by the ideas which have carried them to this point in 
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history. The most carefully crafted bitterent Freud offers the common man indicated also a 
craftsman-like exaltation of him: “Let us return to the common man and to his religion—the only 
religion that ought to bear that name” (23). The “common” man, superannuated and primitive, 
perhaps simply ungoverned by Law and conscience is common because of his religion and also in 
spite of it. Freud says in this passage that there exists a relational dependency between the 
common and religious because we at first draw out from the statement that religion is an attribute 
of natural rather than civil man, but Freud criticizes both. 
 As Freud reiterates, there exists an inverse relationship with the Promethean tools of 
scientific progress and the gradation of agitation and violence such tools bring forth into a 
civilized culture. Shelley, scientific dilettante19 he was, recognized this happening in his own 
country from Italy in 1820, and suggests through Prometheus Unbound a possibility of balancing 
this scale, if not wholly counteracting it—Imagination.   
 And here we turn back again to how Freud sets up the Eternal City metaphor. He says: 
  Now let us, by a flight of imagination, suppose Rome is not a human   
  habitation but a psychical entity with similarly long and copious past—an entity,  
  that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will pass away  
  and all the earlier stages of development continue to exist alongside the latest one.  
  (18; emphasis mine)  
Again, the burden falls on the imagination to complete seemingly impossible tasks, to render 
pictorially, and, according to Shelley’s definition of poet, grammatically in language or image the 
                                                
19 Read Richard Holmes Literary biography, Shelley: The Pursuit.  
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mental life of our minds. Still more mark how Freud suggests the “flight” of imagination, which 
posits an undecidable distinction between soaring like a bird or escaping like a coward. Such a 
distinction calls attention to the fight/flight mechanism of language in general, but that we see 
Prometheus bound to an “eagle-baffling” mountain in the first scene, since he is literally 
disemboweled repeatedly by birds, suggests something more sinister at work. Prometheus is a 
carcass for all physical purposes, food for ravens and other scavengers,20 a psychically raped 
cannibal indebted to his own curse on Jupiter.   
 This brings my essay toward an understanding of this supposed embodied idea of moral 
excellence, Prometheus, against and for which he struggles, succeeds and fails. I find that 
Prometheus casts an implicit shadow on the rest of Shelley’s poem, Prometheus, and poetry, 
meriting an accurate and exact reflection of Shelley’s philosophic and poetic ideals. This would be 
one way to read the poem Prometheus Unbound, yet there is another far more tempting and 
interesting. From this line of reasoning I proceed. First, Prometheus Unbound is high tragedy. In 
addition, its tragic hero is Demogorgon. In sum, because the history the poem is always trying to 
iterate through moments of psychological distress, the reader of it can only conjure events, single 
occurrences, rather than singular knowledge of truth. The psychical pressure that these fractures 
bring about in both reader and Prometheus, alongside interpretive efforts driving toward 
understanding the poem as a coherent whole, fractures critical attempts to individuate them 
spatially or temporally. This is to say, there is no reality in Prometheus Unbound, nor any literal 
signpost or rhetorical theory we can point to in order to measure its moments and match our 
                                                
20 Scavengers, which include literary critics and unkind readers also, as Shelley’s initial 
understanding of Keats’s death suggests. 
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expectations. Shelley writes a purely imaginative document, unfiltered, employing primal 
impulses alone, ones that would actually, along this line of reasoning, deteriorate when published. 
That we do not hear Shelley today, Prometheus Unbound is not regularly read in English 
departments demonstrates its truly uncanny nature because the author we thought we knew, 
knows us so much better.   
 I said earlier I would look closer at Mercury’s speech addressed to Prometheus in act I.21 
I also said that when we add the six lines which follow Mercury’s speech, we begin to isolate out 
of the poem an inimitable sonnet, which operates in terms of an intentional deceit? by Shelley 
regarding action and thought of the principle players also. For convenience and clarity, I quote 
the passage a second time, this time all fourteen lines: 
  MERCURY.         Yet pause, and plunge 
  Into Eternity, where recorded time, 
  Even all that we imagine, age on age,  
  Seems but a point, and the reluctant mind 
  Flags wearily in its unending flight 
  Till it sink, dizzy, blind, lost, shelterless;  
  Perchance it has not numbered the slow years  
  Which thou [Prometheus] must spend in torture, unreprieved. 
   
  PROMETHEUS. Perchance no thought can count them—yet they pass.  
   
  MERCURY. If thou might’st dwell among the Gods the while 
                                                
21 See page 5 of my thesis.  
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  Lapped in voluptuous joy?— 
   
  PROMETHEUS. I would not quit  
  This bleak ravine, these unrepentant pains.  
   
  MERCURY.Alas! I wonder at, yet pity thee. (I.17-29) 
I take this passage as dramatic irony on a macrocosmic level; macrocosmic because the Eternal 
and Infinite are reduced to a “point.” But to fully comprehend the sardonic sphere which Shelley 
adopts in this exchange, one must turn again back to the epigraph to the preface of Prometheus, 
one must hear it howling beneath the text, “[d]o you hear this, Amphiarus, hidden away under 
the earth?” Remember the footnote to this epigraph that the editors of the Norton provide is that 
Shelley is doing what Aeschylus does: he is parodying the Dionysus lifestyle, the inability of a 
culture to not only see but prepare for the future, a culture that will not abide its own ruins, will 
not stoically submit to suffering.  
 What else is Mercury’s question, “If thou might’st dwell among the Gods the while / 
Lapped in voluptuous joy,” but another way of asking, will you live, Prometheus, as do Gods, all 
pleasure, whimsy, indifferent, self-cannibalized by hate and rancor? So now we can read the 
epigraph not only as an ego-maniacal (and manacled) announcement of genius, one that 
transcends the Greek tragedians’s accomplishments even, but also a haunting taunt of what the 
Greek’s valued above all else: balance, equipoise, stoicism, Apollonian ethics, basically. Shelley is 
calling this way of merging with the cosmos utterly foolish and impossible, in such a way that 
the epigraph actually overhears itself burying Aeschylus while also sending him soaring into 
snow burning peeks of the Indian Caucasus, all resolve endlessly torn and flayed by winged-
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carrions.  
 Of course, Shelley is doing something else echoing the epigraph in Prometheus’s exchange 
with Mercury. He calls his “hero,” Prometheus, an impossible fool for stoically suffering three-
thousand years of physical torture at the decree of an infantile, though patriarchal Monarch, 
Jupiter; yet Prometheus is just as childish and irrational in his unwillingness to recall his curse 
and be the savior of mankind, but if this is so, then why?  
 I think Shelley is pointing out to us that Prometheus in his conception is not a “beautiful 
idealism of moral excellence,” but quite the contrary. The uncanny effect this difference of the 
idea of Prometheus produces relies on the difficulty of naming literal from rhetorical. Paul de 
Man tells us that for Shelley’s last poem, The Triumph of Life, this difficulty creates for readers 
certain deafness, but de Man’s admonition applies equally to Prometheus Unbound: 
  The Triumph of Life warns that nothing, whether deed, word, thought, or text,  
  ever happens in relation, positive or negative, to anything that precedes, follows,  
  or exists elsewhere, but only as a random event, whose power, like the power of  
  death, is due to the randomness of its occurrence.22 (122)  
So the power of chance, which for Freud is the superior power of fate, drives all relational 
connections we make, whether in the name of psyche, history or the aesthetic. Poetry then, 
Shelley’s Prometheus and Prometheus certainly, is an impotent figure, and our expectations for 
the Titan and author always unmatched because an expectation is another name for the eventual 
realization of relational connections.  
 Intentionality also becomes a relational illusion in de Man’s understanding of Shelley and 
                                                
22 de Man, Paul. Blindness and Insight.  
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Romanticism. One proposition of this thesis is the question of intentionally, the apparent 
disjunction between what is heard and read, said and meant, irony and reference. “I would feign 
be / What it is my destiny to be” is the line that carries the whole first act, and Prometheus as a 
model/anti-model and idea. Absolutely irrelevant what Prometheus’s destiny literally is, he ends 
up with Asia, which some characterize as pure Love, but which I contend is simply an extension 
of Prometheus, his anima other. Confined to a cave-like dwelling fit for aesthetes only, taking 
upon himself the mystery not of things but their transformation into beautiful things, 
independent of the subject of his liberation, mankind. The transformation Shelley acquires 
throughout the poem for Prometheus is astonishing. Consider that at its opening Prometheus is 
bounded to the E/earth and ends up descending its remotest depths with Asia in order to enact 
Demogorgon. While this conclusion shows Prometheus absolutely free, each air-born thought a 
blessing rather than curse conceived by the mind to spark the Promethean fire into the very 
remotest depths of humanity’s intellect, to satisfy every flash of his and our minds, yet reluctant 
to engage the revolution he apparently undergoes on humanity’s behalf.  
 However, though the literal fate of Prometheus might be out of his hands, that Shelley 
chooses “feign” to try and put it there for his and the sake of his readers, encompasses what 
Freud says is beyond (yet) the grasp of “modern” science and philosophy. That is, holding 
during the same temporal event two contrary ideas, historical polarities and the bi-polarity of 
mental life, in general. The homophonous correlation, and therefore annihilation of reading “fain,” 
which denotes will and intentionality, as “feign,” which denotes deception and pretence, pulls 
from Prometheus’s hands control of the poem. Shelley realizes this and so invents Demogorgon, 
who and what is no invention at all, but the very source of the fractal nature of will and intention.  
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  For Shelley, Prometheus’s intention at times evidences a misguided model of action and 
thought, stemming from his own psychical history between himself and father; for reader, a 
model of human progress and culture, and therefore not very interesting, like any model of 
perfection always is. Mercury tells us in his speech that only with great “reluctance” does the 
mind “pause, and plunge / Into Eternity,” as if in assurance against history and psyche’s birth of 
it. “Reluctance” implies doubt, uncertainty and fear at bottom, but Prometheus does know that 
this is the natural way of things, that men and the ideas men produce are always passing by 
whether men understand only the literal, rhetorical or both; Prometheus is untraumatized because 
his reluctant mind is “unrepentant,” living in an always already to be uncertain future.  
 This dissociation between the literal and rhetorical is captured toward the end of the first 
act. Having passed through his dark night of the soul, Prometheus delivers an agitated but 
impassioned speech, one that thematically unites the next three acts. He despairs indifferently 
and yet intellectually at his position, one occupied some two hundred years earlier by 
Shakespeare’s hero, Posthumous, of the late romance, Cymbeline. I quote this passage from 
Prometheus Unbound in its entirety because I judge, to a large degree, the thematic coherence and 
incoherence of the poem’s last three acts upon the foundation this monologue lays:  
 How fair these air-born shapes! and yet I feel 
 Most vain all hope but love, and thou art far, 
  Asia! Who when my being overflowed 
  Wert like a golden chalice to bright wine 
  Which else had sunk into the thirsty dust. 
  All things are still—alas! how heavily 
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  This quiet morning weighs upon my heart;  
  Though I should dream, I could even sleep with grief 
  If slumber were denied not…I would fain  
  Be what it is my destiny to be,  
  The saviour and the strength of mankind 
  Or sink into the original gulph of things… 
  There is no agony and no solace left;  
  Earth can conslole, Heaven can torment no more. (I.807-20) 
 The first line, “[h]ow fair these air-born shapes,” is in response to Panthea’s observation 
that “[o]nly a sense / Remains of them […],” but the two puns are clear: one hears air-born and 
heir-born, sense and sins simultaneously, whether we choose to attribute meaning to one or the 
other is irrelevant; that Shelley’s language is elastic, fluid and dynamic is key. The moderation of 
these two, there are dozens, calls attention to the violent and hostile transculturation happening 
at this time in England (Shelley, again, composed Prometheus Unbound in Italy) and the 
continent. Because Shelley viewed the French Revolution as a clash between the superannuated 
aristocracy and progressive bourgeois, one understands why heir and sins correlate. The French 
and English nobles, while “civil,” were too natural and vulgar in their ethical judgments on 
religious affairs. While the merchant-class bourgeois maintained a deep fidelity to the Church, 
their civility and scientific sophistication questionable (note that Percy Shelley was once and 
already, and probably always, in many ways Lord Percy Bysshe Shelley, and his life became a 
renunciation of the indefinite article each title of nobility signifies). 
  It should be noted that Demogorgon is a polemical idea and figure in Shelleyean 
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scholarship. Fate, Destiny, Law, Necessity, even the Dialectic itself is attributed to him. Called 
many names, I prefer the one he gives himself, Eternity. And rather than iconoclastically trying 
to subvert all previous critical attempts to define this indefinite article, Demogorgon, I 
demonstrate how all are correct and in some way betray our desire for a Father’s protection. 
From not only external threats but what Freud calls “universal love of mankind,” an “oceanic” 
and sublime glimpse of something lost, denied and rebuked, but also from the agitation and 
intense anxiety stemming from will transcending reason, intent compass, are we safe in 
Demogoron’s sphere. Demogorgon is History, history and Psyche, or chaos, for short. I conclude 
this thesis with a discussion of Demogorgon and Freud’s discussion of Moses and monotheism, 
so for now, I need only make the claim that Demogorgon is the heard hero of the poem. The 
point which we return to now because of its uncanny effect, owns something terrifying in its 
target. An agent of order materializing from chaos riding an Ezekial chariot, Demogorgon cycles 
the psychical history of Shelley’s mind in Prometheus’s composition and all of Shelley’s 
compositions. That Prometheus and Prometheus is both semantic and semiotic, poem, Titan and 
fable of Titan, grammatically renders him untenable (in 1820 and 2009) as an object of aesthetic 
appreciation, of what a perfect man might be, do, say and think. I would think this man more 
“gorgon” than “demos,” perhaps a monster for the people instead of and by them.   
 Yet still this is not the full story of Prometheus in his eponomial unbinding, still less of 
the complex interregnum of literal and rhetorical one finds in the above-quoted speech, which 
again construes itself as sonnet at fourteen lines, that aporia of hope and despair in which 
Prometheus, and Shelley, no doubt, finds himself limited and micro-scoped—Love. “Most vain 
all hope but love, and thou art far […],” Prometheus says, assigning love, or so it seems, a 
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tributary position to hope, but love is “thou,” and “art” distant; in other words, Prometheus 
quietly submits to fate and becomes a tertiary presence behind Demogorgon and Shelley. 
Prometheus, that is, equates the subject of Art, reified in Thou to the eternal other, the non-self 
or Freudian double. Love is not the anima Asia in this poem, but Art, which is culture, which is 
tradition, civilization, which, as Freud convincingly argues, is our modern anxiety and discontent. 
As long as History parades itself as sequential narrative in space, as a literal parade, a triumph 
rather than infinite singularities which are never rendered whole, but which seekers, in-questers, 
maybe, then art will possess not even the merciful of all destinies, a quiet and quick death, but 
gets filtered through the psyches of those who wield it for individual history; Jupiter is a prime 
example of this, a law-giver who is bound by Law, attached to a physical as Prometheus is 
mental rock. Freud says something in The Uncanny that sheds light on this linguistic paradox, 
that Northrop Frye termed “overhearing,” the highest possible eventuality of self-criticsim:  
 Yet it is not only this content—[superannuated primordial narcissism of which 
Prometheus owns a great deal]—which is objectionable to self-criticism that can 
be embodied in the figure of the double: in addition there are all the possibilities 
which had they been realized, might have shaped our destiny, and to which our 
imagination still clings, all the strivings of the ego that were frustrated by adverse 
circumstances, all the suppressed acts of volition that fostered the illusion of free 
will. (143) 
 This passage is heard often but not read, simply because it brings about in our psyches a 
disturbing trinity of “learnt repose,” which we do not learn but guess at and pretend to own: self-
criticism, imagination and free will (II.5). I do not believe that Freud privileges as “truth” 
   
 49 
necessity or determinism over free will and liberty, but how I do not believe this is simple: the 
first line of Civilization and its Discontents, once again, is “It is impossible to escape the 
impression that people commonly use false standards of measurement.” We read this, but what 
does not follow is this: there is a correct standard of measurement and you, reader, are about to 
see me explain and demonstrate it. Of course I don’t attribute any special truth to Freud, no more 
so than I would any other seminal author of modernism, or romanticism, for that matter. But 
what is true is that Freud always employs his imagination to choose to believe the fictional world 
from which his visions of the psyche prophesize themselves in reality, and, greater still, such a 
vision claims as its driving force Eros, the life-drive, which for Freud was truth driven inward 
toward the depth of psyche. This raises the questions whether it is necessary for psychological 
health to believe in fictitious things, whether things that do not exist in our reality, like the 
events, figures and speeches of Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, or an omniscient and retributive 
father figure called God, are essential ingredients in understanding and measuring the things that 
do impact us. Perhaps, however, this is more a question of linguistics, definition, grammar: 
realities and fictions are thus and so because we define them thus and so with so many or few 
words.  
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Conclusions 
I have no qualms in saying that men have always known […] that once upon a time they had a 
primeval father and killed him. 
—Freud (Moses and Monotheism. 1939) 
 I began this thesis talking about hearing and reading, rebellion and imagination, ruin and 
preservation; now I will talk about murder, and demonstrate through Freud and Shelley how 
original sin is nothing but psychological and grammatical murder. In 1939, Freud’s Moses and 
Monotheism was published and other tremendous, though not cataclysmic transpired. The date 
may seem uncanny, but it’s only familiar; if people read it or heard it otherwise, then maybe I 
would not be discussing it now. Feud’s thesis in this book is that Moses, the Law-giver of 
Judaism, was, in fact, not Jewish but a noble Egyptian of the Pharaoh’s court around 1350bc. 
Centuries later, when the Jewish people were prepared to remember and be influenced by Moses 
as a great individual, who delivered and sustained through memory the “One God Only” religious 
system, primeval Father of the Jewish people, several events, according to Freud, transpired at 
the same time:  
 The [Jews] people met with hard times; the hopes based on the favour of God 
were slow in being fulfilled; it became not easy to adhere to the illusion, cherished 
above all else, that they were God’s chosen people. If they wished to keep 
happiness, then the consciousness of guilt [that they killed God, and were now 
acknowledging it through the return of the repressed cultural memories] that they 
themselves were such sinners offered a welcome excuse for God’s severity. (173)  
Such is Freud’s proposition, but how does one get to Shelley’s poem through Freud? I think the 
answer is that I do not. A chiasmic dependence on reading Freud through Shelley’s Prometheus 
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Unbound and hearing Prometheus Unbound through Freud accomplishes two aims of literary 
history: first, the text is always task; second, forget the text because once you read it, it is no 
longer a text, it is history. 
 Literary history is all text, and of course much more than text. Before history becomes the 
material happening of text, it is psychic, immaterial, yet as soon as deeds becomes words, which 
are then internalized back into the psyche through reading, something is lost. This something is 
characterized by its presence, immediacy, homology and synchronicity. It could be called chance, 
but it could also be called allegory. The relationship between words and deeds is allegorized in the 
relationship between self and civilization, and vise versa. Another way of saying this is the 
relationship between Psyche and History is allegorized in the relationship between Shelley and 
Freud, and vise versa. The main point of these relationships and oppositions is the question of 
relation. What allegories do is impose relations by seeming to discover them. This is why Shelley 
introduces Demogorgon into Prometheus Unbound. To recall Paul de Man, Demogorgon is the 
trope of the name zero:  
  It is as sign that language is capable of engendering the principles of infinity, of  
  genus, species, and homogeneity, which allow for synecdochal totalizations, but  
  none of these tropes could come about without the systemic effacement of the  
  zero and its reconversion into a name. There can be no one without zero, but the  
  zero always appears in the guise of a one, of a (some)thing. The name is the trope  
  of the zero. The zero is always called a one, when zero is actually nameless,  
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  “innommable.”23 (59) 
Demogorgon is something of a logarithm, a word and number. Shelley tells us in the preface to 
Prometheus that his goal is greater than to merely reconcile the oppressor with the oppressed of 
humankind. Demogorgon makes possible in the poem this transcendence of language in the guise 
of its absence. Remember, Demogorgon tells us to demand no dire name.   
 It is often noted that Prometheus never meets Demogorgon or addresses him. Asia alone 
divines his council. Because Asia is understood to be pure Love, it makes sense, critics believe, to 
match this Love with Necessity. But I posit a different interpretation. Prometheus’s guilt spikes 
to such a level in the first act that he traumatizes himself out of his author’s drama. When one 
reads the first few speeches of Prometheus’s, intersticed with Greek-like choruses and spirits, 
one gathers that Prometheus, whose will is infinite and unconquerable, nevertheless cannot 
remember what he said to Jupiter. It would be extraordinarily naïve to assume that Prometheus’s 
despair is caused by a memory dosed with three thousand years of torture, for if this is the case, 
then others in the play would suffer the same amnesia. Yet there is something special about how 
and what Prometheus remembers, that makes a great impression on the reader and affects an 
uncanny sense: the Phantasm of Jupiter. Prometheus remembers his curse/course because Shelley 
has the Phantasm of Jupiter repeat it to him. The curse reads like a homily or prayer, and it 
should because Prometheus is listening to the words in obeisance:  
       O’er all things but thyself I gave thee power,  
  And my own Will. 
  --------------------------------- 
          I curse thee! Let a sufferer’s curse 
                                                
23 de Man, Paul. Aesthetic Ideology.  
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          Clasp thee, his torturer, like remorse,  
          Till think Infinity shall be  
          A robe of envenomed agony; 
                        And thine Omnipotence a crown of pain 
  To cling like burning gold round thy dissolving brain. 
  ------------------------------  
  Both infinite as is the Universe,  
      And thou, and thy self-torturing solitude. 
      An awful image of calm power 
      Though now thou sittest, let the hour  
      Come, when thou must appear to be  
      That which thou art internally. (I.273-99) 
 Through this curse, the poem undergoes many changes, textual and thematic. On the 
surface, we see Prometheus developing cognitively and emotionally, but his brain is “dissolving,” 
and to explain this attribute of the poetic mind, one must turn again to levels and ways or reading 
the word “dissolving.” Jupiter later dissolves when Demogorgon ascends to his ethereal throne, 
destroys his power over Earth, Prometheus and humanity, and so too Demogorgon, when he 
descends back to the depths. Moses, we can say, according to Freud’s argument, dissolves also, 
until that time when the vital needs of the Jewish people are not being met, and his dissolution is 
based on mass guilt based on the severity of God’s judgments; then he reappears as a forgotten 
memory and is caged once more, like Demogorgon, until the One God Only need be resurrected 
again.  
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 If we focus on the word “dissolve,” we begin to see inside of it “solve,” “soul,” “sole,” 
“dis,” “evolve,” even “love,” etc. Again, this is an exemplary instance of the literal trapped in the 
rhetorical, or visa versa. What we read is the pejorative dissolve; we do not hear its contrary, 
coalesce, because this is the word Shelley knows we desire, but for a poet such as Shelley, it is a 
far greater intellectual accomplishment for the brain to dissolve like sand, to (as its etymology 
suggests, come apart toward pluralism) than incorporate into the bondage of One. But there is 
another, more focused and intentional ambivalency in the Phantasm’s speech, far beyond the 
sphere of even the question of the indefinite article “phantasm,” and which leads me into the 
discussion of Moses and Demogorgon, or at the macrocosmic level, Freud and Shelley, Psyche 
and History:  
                                        [L]et the hour  
  Come, when thou must appear to be  
  That which thou art internally.   
These three lines merit close attention if only because they propose that appearance and the 
interpretation of appearance are linked by this word “art.” The binary carries further appearance 
and reality to external and internal, and only one figure in Prometheus Unbound owns completely 
the internal, depths, gulph of things, Demogorgon.  
 One gets the sense that there is something always moiling and seething, like a volcano, to 
be sure, but unlike a mountain peak, unlike Prometheus. The volcanization of Demogorgon is 
forecasted in the second line of the poem, “[a]ll spirits but One [Demogorgon],” and his home 
more potent than the mountain because of its destructive, terrifying and chaotic nature. If a 
mountain were to symbolize our unconscious minds, then a volcano would symbolize both our 
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unconscious and conscious minds. Demogorgon is the monotheistic access to Prometheus 
Unbound, like Moses is the pure monotheistic force, as a great man, to Moses and Monotheism.  
 Shelley’s monism, I propose, masques as Manichaeism in a similar correlative of 
Judaism’s pure monotheism to Christianity’s Trinitarian doctrine, which by definition alone can 
never be monotheistic. Shelley makes this point setting up his own fictive players, Demogorgon, 
Jupiter and Prometheus; Asia, conceivably, could be substituted for anyone of these since her 
power is Love, an attribute or absence in all three. This relationship lets me say that Demogorgon 
is the literally and rhetorical hero of Prometheus Unbound, and Asia’s descent to Demogorgon’s 
cave is a descent into the remote corner of what Freud calls the super-ego, conscience, internal 
Law. But I think it goes still further than Freud’s terminology, or is a more accurate wording of it, 
at least, because in Demogorgon’s case there is not submission whatsoever to external law or 
reality—Demogorgon reigns supreme in this imaginary world while at once stimulating its 
transculturalization. Each evocation of Demogorgon in order to reinscribe psychical/cyclical 
history is an announcement of the failure of society to meet the needs of individuals; each 
centrality, announces the end of an event and its beginning. 
 The echoes presage exactly this chiasmic relationship, which Demogorgon embodies:  
  In the world unknown  
      Sleeps a voice unspoken;  
  By thy step alone 
      Can its rest be broken,  
        Child of Ocean! (II.189-94)  
The chorus is well aware of what Demogorgon is and even alludes to the first literal murder of 
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genesis, in which “Cain,” or “Can” kills Abel. True poets, Shelley suggests speak an unspoken 
language, and literary critics, historians, scientists and philosophers must overhear it in order to 
move beyond logo and ego centrism; yet the central point of this passage tells us that “step” is 
key. I read the line, “By thy step alone,” as something like we must be near in proximity to 
poets, great men, even such as contrary thinkers Shelley and Moses, that by this “step” we raise 
ourselves, and raze simultaneously to rest, death. A step is only an action, a movement toward a 
value of greater resolve, peace and rest; it is abrupt and cyclical, so perhaps we are not ready to 
read Shelley’s step yet, perhaps this is why we do not hear him.  
 To return to Asia’s interrogation of Demogorgon, which begins by Demogorgon’s 
interrogation of her when he asks of her, “Ask what thou wouldst know” (II.iii.7), I quote only 
Demogorgon’s words, not Asia’s, knowing full well their meanings interrelate and hinge on being 
read together, but for Freud’s sake, and Moses’s, I choose to hear only Demogorgon’s:  
  DEMOGORGON. Ask what thou would’st know.  
  ------------------------------  
  DEMOGORGON. All things thou dar’st demand 
  ------------------------------ 
  DEMOGORGON. God. 
  ------------------------------ 
  DEMOGORGON. God, Almighty God.  
  ------------------------------ 
  DEMOGORGON. Merciful God. 
  ------------------------------ 
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  DEMOGORGON. He reigns. 
  ------------------------------ 
  DEMOGORGON. He reigns.  
This is the sum of all Demogorgon says until in act three Jupiter, sitting on his throne, asks, 
“Awful Shape, what art thou? Speak!” and Demogorgon replies, “Eternity—demand no direr 
name […],” (50-1) but the sum of his words places on scholarship an unbearable onus,” because 
we can only understand these characters, these alphabetic symbols even, as literal parts of a 
rhetorical whole; so that what we see when we quote only what we choose to quote is aporias 
and lacunae, the “[s]corn[ed] track thy lagging fall through boundless space and time” (I.301). 
Reading between the lines in Prometheus Unbound is a challenge, to be sure; numerous aporetic 
objections exist in both poem and scholarship it solicits. Calling attention again to the “--------,” 
or the lacunae that I construct, I see how perhaps reading is vision, giving a pulse to the blank 
flatline inscription of a writer’s death and monument, his poetry. When we do this, fill in the 
blanks, so to speak, we measure aesthetically, and therefore also politically, what Shelley calls 
the track of “thy lagging fall,” which is really just a step on another tower, further in distance 
from the Earth, but still bounded to it by language. This language can be merciful, as in New 
Testament or almighty, as in Old. But it is imperative to read and hear the language, above all, to 
see its inscription between the aporetic lacuna, the literal and rhetorical.  
 Of course Freud has something to say about all this in Moses and Monotheism, but he 
does not use the terminology adopted by several generations of literary critics. He actually begins 
Moses and Monotheism with one such, the most important one, ambivalency mentioned in the 
previous paragraph: “To deny a people the man whom it praises as the greatest of its sons is not 
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a deed to be taken lightheartedly.” This is exactly what he does and he knows it; this is exactly 
what the Jews do to Moses and they probably know it; finally, this is exactly what we do to 
Freud and the psychologists are beginning to understand it. Freud’s opening line is further 
complicated by the word “sun,” since Freud could be talking about Egyptian Sun Gods, Old 
Testament prophets, the father-son dynamic in family romances, or Christ. I contend Freud does 
and intends all four, but this is not important at this point in my thesis. Freud begins with a 
denial and ends with this:  
 If we are quite clear in our minds that procedure like the present one—to take 
from the traditional material what seems useful and to reject what is unsuitable, 
and then to put the individual pieces together according to their psychological 
probability—does not afford any security for finding the truth, then one is quite 
right to ask why such an attempt was undertaken. In answer to this I must cite the 
result. If we substantially reduce the sever demands usually made on a historical 
and psychological investigation, then it might be possible to clear up problems that 
have always seemed worthy of attention and that, in consequence of recent events, 
force themselves again on our observation. (133; emphasis mine) 
The “recent events” to which Freud refers is the beginning of WWII and the systematic, 
mechanized, “civilized,” one abhors to say, elimination of Jews. Substitute 9/11, and the 
permanent state of war it enacts between East and West, and more prophetic words exist no 
where else in twentieth century thought. Freud is also demonstrating, by producing an uncanny 
effect, the conclusion to his book which opens new possibilities of thinking about civilization.  
  I want to end with Shelley, since Prometheus Unbound got me to Freud in the first place. 
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The explication of “ravin” I delivered in chapter one still resonates. The OED defines an obsolete, 
perhaps uncanny definition of the word: “The sound of the cry of a raven.” Along which course 
will we feed in the twenty-first century: literal, rhetorical, both? Or will we try to annihilate and 
dissolve the ravin in ourselves, cannibalize all that it worthy of the idea, Love, the event History, 
make from it a Psychic corpse?  
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